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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward
The 2011-2012 survey period1 featured decisions of the appellate
courts in areas ranging from medical privacy to diligent job searches,
with only minor legislation impacting the Workers' Compensation Act.2
I.

LEGISLATION

The legislative changes' enacted by the Georgia General Assembly
impacting the Workers' Compensation Act were relatively minimal. The
Act provides for a twenty percent penalty for income benefits paid under
the terms of an award or settlement that are not paid within twenty
days of becoming due, and section 34-9-221(f) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 4 was modified to allow the board to
excuse failure to make timely payment if the failure is "due to conditions
beyond the control of the employer."5
In order to facilitate the use of offsets in settlement documents,
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(c) s was modified to allow either the board or "any
party to the settlement agreement [to] require that the settlement

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Ecki & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A-, 1977); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1980). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.

** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eckl &Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (BA, summa cum laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum

laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia workers' compensation law during the prior survey period,
see H. Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of

Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2011).
2. O.C.G.A. tit. 34 ch. 9 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 971, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 9 (Supp. 2012));
Ga. H.R. Bill 548, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (Supp. 2012)).
4. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
5. Ga. H.R. Bill 971 § 2.
6. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
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documents contain language which prorates the lump sum settlement
over the life expectancy of the injured wotker."7
Changes were made to the Workers' Compensation Act (specifically to
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226 that relate to the appointment of a guardian or
conservator for a minor or incompetent claimant, including the
modification of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(a) to provide authority for appointment of "a conservator or the equivalent thereof duly appointed by a
court of competent jurisdiction outside the State of Georgia."9 In
addition, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(b) was modified to delete the word
"temporary" and to eliminate the fifty-two week limit on any such board
appointment of conservators for "administering workers' compensation
rights and benefits" or for a guardian ad litem "to bring or defend an
action under this chapter in the name of and for the benefit of said
minor or legally incompetent person," and also increases to $100,000 the
level at which the board loses authority to appoint a conservator for a
minor or legally incompetent person for the purpose of settling that
individual's workers' compensation claim.'" Furthermore, O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-226(b)(2) was amended to clarify that there is no need to appoint
a conservator "where the natural parent is the guardian of a minor and
the settlement amount is less than $15,000.00," along with a new
provision that "[a]fter settlement, the board shall retain the authority to
resolve disputes regarding continuing representation of a board
appointed conservator of a minor or legally incompetent person...."11
A number of changes were made to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-264,12 which
governs occupational loss of hearing caused by harmful noise.' 3 The
code section was modified to allow consideration of hearing losses at a
3000 cycles per second level in addition to 500, 1000, and 2000 cycles per
second levels, and to allow multiple other technical changes in the
amount of decibels and frequencies used to measure the losses of hearing
deemed to constitute a compensable hearing disability. 4 It further
adjusts the formula for measuring hearing impairment to allow for "each
decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels an allowance of 1 1/2 percent shall
be made up to the maximum of 100 percent which is reached at 92
decibels." 5

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ga. H.R. Bill 971 § 1.
O.C.GA. § 34-9-226 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Ga. H.R. BiU 971§ 3.
Id.
id.
O.C.-.A. § 34-9-264 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 971 § 4.
Id.
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The definition of "employee" contained in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(2)16 was
revised to exclude "[individuals who are parties to a franchise agreement as set out by the Federal Trade Commission franchise disclosure
rule, 16 C.F.R. 436.1 through 436.11 .... .""
II.

PRE-AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL CARE

The Georgia Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court addressed
the impact and scope of the WC-205 board form this survey period. In
Mulligan v. Selective HR Solutions, Inc., the claimant initially injured
her back at work in September 2005, received treatment, and returned
to work in July 2006. In May 2007, she re-injured her back while at
home. The authorized treating physician (ATP) determined that surgery
was necessary and sent a WC-205 form to the employer/insurer
(employer), requesting pre-authorization. More than one month later,
the employer returned the form, refusing to authorize surgery absent a
second opinion; three days later the ATP performed surgery."9
The administrative law judge (ALT) denied the claim for benefits,
holding that the employee had not shown a change in condition from her
original injury, and that she had not proven the recent back surgery was
compensable, and the board affrmed.' The Superior Court of Bibb
County, Georgia reversed with respect to the issue regarding preauthorization of medical treatment pursuant to Rule 205,21 holding that
the employer's failure to respond to the WC-205 form within five days
automatically triggered the-obligation for the employer to pay for the
medical care.22

Because the board's rule-making authority is limited, the court of
appeals focused on whether a rule altering the burden of proof as to
compensability in favor of the claimant is procedural or substantive, and
it concluded that such a burden-shifting rule is substantive.23 The
court concluded that, to the extent Rule 205 precludes the employer from
contesting the compensability of treatment, the Rule is invalid as to
substantive rule-making, which impermissibly shifts the claimant's
burden to prove that an injury is work-related. 2'

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Ga. H.R. Bi 548 § 1.
289 Ga. 753, 716 S.E.2d 150 (2011).
Id. at 754, 716 S.E.2d at 152.
Id. at 754-55, 716 S.E.2d at 152.
O.C.GA. § 34 app. r. 205 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Mulligan, 289 Ga. at 755, 716 S.E.2d at 152.
Id. at 755-56, 716 S.E.2d at 153.
Id. at 755, 716 S.E.2d at 152.
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The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals's
opinion that the board had- exceeded its rule-making authority.25 The
supreme court held that the court of appeals considered Rule 205(b)(3Xa)
in isolation and overlooked Rule 205(b)(1)(a)'s requirement that the
medical treatment be paid in accordance with the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) where the treatment or test was related to the on-thejob injury.26 In other words, a failure to timely respond to a WC-205
does not do away with the threshold requirement that the medical care
be for a compensable injury.27 The supreme court agreed with the
holding that evidence supported a ruling that the claimant did not
sustain a second compensable injury, and so affirmed the decision on
other grounds. 8 The court also noted that failure to timely respond
to
29
a WC-205 may still subject the employer to penalties and fees.
III.

WC-207

In McRae v. Arby's Restaurant Group,3" the Georgia Court of Appeals
concluded that the Act does not compel a claimant to authorize her
treating physician to talk to the employer's attorney ex parte in
exchange for receiving benefits in a compensable claim. 31 The claimant
sustained a compensable injury, and during the course of her claim
executed a WC-207 form, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-207(b). 32 Counsel
for the employer attempted to schedule an ex parte consultation with the
doctor. The doctor declined to meet with the attorney until he provided
express permission from the claimant. Counsel filed a motion seeking
an order from the ALJ authorizing the doctor to meet with the employer's attorney privately or else removing the claimant's hearing request.
The ALJ granted the motion, and when the claimant refused to sign
such a release, the ALJ removed the hearing from the calendar. The
board and the Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed the decision.33
The majority opinion quoted extensively from the recent decision of
Baker v. Wellstar Health Systems,' which involved allegations of

25. Id. at 755-56, 716 S.E.2d at 153.
26. Id. at 756-57, 716 S.E.2d at 153-54.
27. Id. at 757, 716 S.E.2d at 153.
28. Id. at 757, 716 S.E.2d at 154.
29. Id. at 757 n.3, 716 S.E.2d at 154 n.3. As noted by the Georgia Supreme Court, Rule
205 was amended effective July 1, 2011. Id. at 757, 716 S.E.2d at 153-54.
30. 313 Ga. App. 313, 721 S.E.2d 602 (2011), cert. granted.
31. Id. at 313, 721 S.E.2d at 603.
32. Id. at 313-14, 721 S.E.2d at 603; see also O.C.G-.A § 34-9-207(b) (2008 & Supp.
2012).
33. McRae, 313 Ga. at 314, 721 S.E.2d at 603.
34. 288 Ga. 336, 703 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
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medical malpractice, stating that considerations of medical privacy exist
in workers' compensation cases as well. 5 The court stated that the Act
does not require a physician to converse ex parte with opposing counsel,
nor does the Act require a claimant to authorize the treating physician
to converse ex parte with opposing counsel in exchange for continued
receipt of benefits.3" The court thus held that the Act did not require
the claimant to authorize the treating physician to communicate ex parte
with counsel for the employer in order to maintain benefits, and reversed
the superior court.3 7 The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on
April 24, 2012.
IV. THE "EXCLUSIVE REMEDY" DocTRINE
The Georgia Court of Appeals examined the "exclusive remedy"
doctrine multiple times during the survey period. In Estate of Pitts v.
City of Atlanta,38 a construction worker was struck and killed by a
vehicle driven by the employee of another subcontractor on the project.
The estate brought suit and recovered a judgment against the subcontractor whose employee drove the vehicle that struck the deceased
worker, but the judgment was not satisfied because of a lack of
insurance. The estate then brought suit against the city and several
construction companies on the project on the grounds that the companies
breached contractual duties in their subcontracts, which required that
each subcontractor carry a minimum of $10 million in automobile
liability insurance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, and the estate appealed. 9
Among the arguments raised by the defendants was the exclusive
remedy provision, which they contended barred the estate from seeking
damages.4'
The court of appeals noted that the exclusive remedy
provision did not bar the estate from bringing suit against the subcontractor responsible for the accident because that subcontractor was
neither an employee of the worker's employer nor a party to any contract
under which it provided workers' compensation benefits to the worker.41
Because the injury for which the estate sought damages in the present
matter was not a physical injury but rather the loss of access to
insurance coverage due to the alleged breach of contract, the court found

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

McRae, 313 Ga. at 315, 721 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 316, 721 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 317, 721 S.E.2d at 605.
312 Ga. App. 599, 719 S.E.2d 7 (2011).
Id. at 599-600, 719 S.E.2d at 9-10.
Id. at 605, 719 S.E.2d at 13.
Id. at 606, 719 S.E.2d at 14.
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that the exclusive remedy provision did not apply.4 While O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-11.1 presumably would have barred a claim for personal injury,
it did not bar the claim for breach of contract.'
In Vratsinas Construction Co. v. Chitwood," the court of appeals
applied the exclusive remedy doctrine to a personal injury claim brought
by an employee of a subcontractor against the subcontractor's general
contractor, holding that the tort'claim was barred.46 The plaintiff was
an employee of a subcontractor hired by the general contractor. While
working on the project the plaintiff suffered an electric shock and
subsequent injuries to his arms, chest, and head. Instead of filing a
workers' compensation claim, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the
general contractor alleging negligent failure to maintain a safe worksite.
The general contractor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was worker's compensation benefits, and
appealed the superior court's denial of its motion. 7
The court of appeals cited O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a)4 for the proposition
that the general contractor becomes the "statutory employer" of the
employees of any subcontractors hired by the general contractor. 4 9 The
court then observed that under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), the rights granted
to employees in the Workers' Compensation Act exclude all other rights
of the employee, including those at common law. O Since it was
undisputed that the general contractor was the statutory employer of the
plaintiff, the general contractor was immune to tort claims brought by
the employee.5 '
Contrarily, in PHFII Buckhead, LLC v. Dinku," the court of appeals
recognized that a company which contracts out certain services to
another company is not the statutory employer of the other company's
employees.53 In Dinku, the claimant was an employee of the parking
services company hired by the operator of a hotel (PHF). When Dinku
was hurt on the job, he filed suit against PHF for failure to maintain a

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 606-07, 719 S.E.2d at 14.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (2008).
Estate of Pitts, 312 Ga. App. at 607, 719 S.E.2d at 14.
314 Ga. App. 357, 723 S.E.2d 740 (2012).
Id. at 358, 723 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 357-58, 723 S.E.2d at 741-42.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (2008).
Vratsinas, 314 Ga. App. at 358, 723 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 358-59, 723 S.E.2d at 742; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a).
Vratsinas, 314 Ga. App. at 360, 723 S.E.2d at 743.
315 Ga. App. 76, 726 S.E.2d 569 (2012).
Id. at 80, 726 S.E.2d at 572-73.
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The court determined that unlike a
reasonably safe premises."
relationship between a gerferal contractor and subcontractor, where the
general contractor owes a duty of performance to the property owner and
employs the subcontractor to that end, a mere property owner does not
owe a duty of performance to a third-party and thus cannot be a
"principal contractor" under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8."5 Because PHF did not
owe a duty of performance to a third-party with regard to the work done
by Dinku (or Dinku's direct employer), PHF was not the statutory
employer of Dinku,. and the exclusive remedy doctrine did not bar the
suit.

56

V. ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

In Stokes v. Coweta County Board of Education," the Georgia Court
of Appeals dealt with the issue of deviation from employment in
determining whether an accident was compensable.58 The claimant, a
school custodian, was responsible for unlocking the parking lot gate. On
the day of her injury, upon unlocking the gate, she turned to see her
vehicle rolling away from her, and ran after her car in an attempt to
stop the vehicle. In so doing, she severely injured her foot, which was
subsequently amputated.59 While the ALJ awarded benefits, the state
board concluded the claimant had deviated from her employment on a
personal mission to save her own personal property, and the superior
court affirmed."9
The court of appeals held that the board misapplied the law in
determining there was a deviation from the course of employment when
the claimant chased after her car.6' The court focused on the facts that
the claimant was performing her employment duties when the car began
to roll, and that but for her fulfilling the requirements of her job, the
accident would not have happened.6 2 Her actions therefore did not
constitute a deviation from her employment.6 3

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 77, 726 S.E.2d at 570.
Id. at 79-80, 726 S.E.2d at 572-73.
Id.
313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012).
Id. at 508-09, 722 S.E.2d at 121-22.
Id. at 507, 722 S.E.2d at 120-21.
Id. at 505, 510, 722 S.E.2d at 119, 122.
Id. at 510-11, 722 S.E.2d at 122-23.
Id. at 510, 722 S.E.2d at 122-23.
Id.
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SUBSEQUENT NON-WORK INJURY

In the case of Flores v. Dependable 77re Co.," the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that a claimant's injuries sustained in a car accident,
which occurred en route from a doctor's appointment for a work-related
injury, were not themselves compensable. 6 The claimant sustained a
compensable back injury, and while in transportation provided by the
employer, was involved in another accident and sustained further
injuries to his back.66
The employer ceased paying for medical treatment on the grounds that
the intervening accident was the cause of the present disability. The
ALJ found that the car accident was work-related and did not constitute
a change in condition, and the board affirmed; however, the superior
court reversed.67 On appeal, the court held that the employer was not
liable for medical expenses resulting solely from the car accident.6" The
court further ruled that the injuries sustained during the claimant's trip
to the doctor on the date of the wreck was voluntary, and thus not
compensable, because the claimant was not traveling to or from work
and because the employer neither required the appointment nor had any
control over the appointment.69
VII.

CREDIT FOR BENEFITS PAIDIRES JUDICATA

In North Fulton Regional Hospital v. Pearce-Williams," the doctrine
of res judicata did not bar the employer from seeking a credit on its
obligation to pay temporary total disability (TTD) based on temporary
partial disability (TPD) payments made. 1 The claimant sustained a
compensable injury in 1999 and received TTD until February 2003, at
which time the employer reduced the claimant to TPD benefits pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2).1 2 In 2008, the claimant filed a hearing
request, alleging her injury was catastrophic, and thereby seeking TTD
retroactive to February 2003. The ALT found the injury catastrophic
and awarded TTD benefits retroactive to the February 2003 suspension
and reduction. The employer then made a lump-sum payment to the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

315 Ga. App. 311, 726 S.E.2d 776 (2012).
Id. at 314, 726 S.E.2d at 779.
Id. at 311, 726 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 312, 726 S.E.2d at 777-78.
Id. at 313, 726 S.E.2d at 778; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-204(a) (2008).
Flores, 315 Ga. App. at 314, 726 S.E.2d at 779.
312 Ga. App. 388, 718 S.E.2d 583 (2011).
Id. at 392, 718 S.E.2d at 586-87.
Id. at 389, 718 S.E.2d at 584-85; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2) (2008).
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claimant for all TTD benefits since February 2003, after taking credit for
the TPD benefits it paid from February 2003 through April 2006. 73
The claimant then filed another hearing request on the grounds that
the employer was not permitted to take credit for the prior TPD
payments, as it had not requested such a credit at the 2008 hearing.
The claimant thus argued the issue was res judicata, and the employer
was barred from re-litigating it. The AUJ agreed with the employer that
the claimant was seeking a windfall; the employer was properly applying
an offset for what it had already paid. The board affirmed, but the
superior court reversed on the grounds that the issue was res judicata.74
The Georgia Court of Appeals examined the issues at the 2008 hearing
as framed by the WC-14, which concerned the claimant's request for
catastrophic designation and payment of fTTD benefits, and the ALJ's
order, which did not discuss any issue of the claimant seeking TTD
benefits in addition to TPD benefits.
The employer was thus not
required to raise that issue at the 2008 hearing.76 The claimant argued
that the employer was required to request its credit pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-24377 and Board Rule 243.78 However, the court
explained that the employer's TPD payments did not fall within the
scope of payments contemplated by § 34-9-243. T9
VIII. SETTLEMENTS AND LATE PAYMENT PENALTIES
In Brewer v. WellStar Health System,"° the parties reached a
compromise settlement, which was approved by the board on July 7,
2009. However, around this time the board was experiencing issues with
some parties not receiving its automated e-mail notice of stipulation
approval, and here neither the employer/self-insurer, its servicing agent,
nor their counsel received such notice and thus did not issue a settlement payment within twenty days after the board's approval.8" The
claimant requested the twenty percent late payment penalty, which the

73. N. Fulton Reg'l Hosp., 312 Ga. App. at 389, 718 S.E.2d at 585.
74. Id. at 390, 718 S.E.2d at 585.
75. Id. at 390-91, 718 S.E.2d at 586.
76. Id. at 391, 718 S.E.2d at 586.
77. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243 (2008).
78. N. Fulton Reg'l Hosp., 312 Ga. App. at 392, 718 S.E.2d at 586; see also O.C.G.A.
§ 34 app. r. 243 (2008).
79. N. Fulton.Reg'l Hosp., 312 Ga. App. at 392, 718 S.E.2d at 586-87. In a concurring
opinion, two justices concurred in the result only, with the result being that the case may
not be cited as binding precedent. Id. at 392-93, 718 S.E.2d at 587 (Barnes, J., concurring).
80. 314 Ga. App. 234, 723 S.E.2d 526 (2012), cert. granted.
81. Id. at 234-35, 723 S.E.2d at 527.
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ALJ granted. s2 But the board reversed, relying on the discretion
granted under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b),8 and also based on the party's
non-receipt of approval notice." The Superior Court of Cobb County,
Georgia affirmed the board.' The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the discretion afforded in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b) only applies
to non-liability settlements and does not give the board discretion for
determining whether the late payment penalty should be assessed on a
The Georgia Supreme Court granted
compromise stipulation.86
certiorari on May 29, 2012.
IX.

JUDICIAL REVIEW/AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

In J & D Trucking v. Martin,7 the Georgia Court of Appeals dealt
with the issue of attorney fees in the employer's handling of a claim with
an average weekly wage dispute.' The claimant, a sole proprietor of
a trucking business, was injured, underwent surgery, and was afterward
disabled for three years. The employer requested a hearing on the
grounds that the claimant failed to prove he received any wages from
the employer, so there was no basis to compute the average weekly wage
or compensation rate. The claimant deposited gross income from the
business into his checking account, from which he paid business and
personal expenses, and did not issue checks to himself for wages.8 9
The ALJ rejected the employer's argument that the claimant did not
meet his burden of proving wages under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2609o because
the business did not make- specific wage or salary payments to the
claimant. 91 Instead, the ALJ used the average gross and net incomes
of the sole proprietorship during the thirteen weeks preceding the injury
and found that the claimant proved he was entitled to the statutory
maximum in TTD benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261.92 The ALJ found
that the employer failed to either timely controvert or commence
payment under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221, without reasonable grounds, and

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 235, 723 S.E.2d at 527.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Brewer, 314 Ga. App. at 235, 723 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 235, 723 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 236, 723 S.E.2d at 528.
310 Ga. App. 247, 712 S.E.2d 863 (2011).
Id. at 247, 712 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 248-49, 712 S.E.2d at 864.
O.C.GA § 34-9-260 (2008).
J & D Trucking, 310 Ga. App. at 248-49, 712 S.E.2d at 864-65.
Id.; see also O.C.GA § 34-9-261 (2008).
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thus assessed attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(bX2). 9" On
appeal, the board found that the ALJ correctly ruled the claimant met
his burden of proving his average weekly wage, but it also found that
the evidence did not support the ALJ's findings to support the conclusion
that the employer failed without reasonable grounds to comply with
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221. The superior court reversed the board and
reinstated the AL's award.94
The court of appeals observed that the board rejected the ALJ's
findings of fact, but did not make any substituted findings of fact.95
The board may substitute its own findings for those of the ALJ, and in
fact, such findings cannot be disturbed on appeal when supported by any
evidence, because the superior court and court of appeals do not have the
power to find facts.98 Alternatively, the board could have ruled on
whether the facts found by the ALJ showed that the employer did not
violate O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221 without reasonable grounds.97 Because
neither step was fully taken, the court remanded to the board for
reconsideration.9"
X.

NoTcE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

In Harris v. Eastman Youth Development Center,99 the claimant
requested catastrophic designation and payment of a weight-loss
program. The ALJ ruled against the claimant, and it also found that
any back degeneration or pain was no longer related to the compensable
knee injury. On appeal, the board vacated and remanded, instructing
that the only issue was catastrophic designation and the ALW should not
address the compensability of the back pain. The ALT issued a new
order denying catastrophic designation and again finding the back
problems related to personal issues and not to the knee injury. The
board and superior court affirmed.' 0
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the ALJ erred in determining
the cause of the back issue because the claimant did not have notice or
opportunity to be heard on that issue. 10 ' The issue to be determined

93. J& D Trucking, 310 Ga. App. at 249, 712 S.E.2d at 865; see also O.C.GA § 34-9108(b)(2) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
94. J & D Trucking, 310 Ga. App. at 249-50, 712 S.E.2d at 865.
95. Id. at 250, 712 S.E.2d at 865.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 250 n.1, 712 S.E.2d at 865 n.1.
98. Id. at 250, 712 S.E.2d at 865-66.
99. 315 Ga. App. 643, 727 S.E.2d 254 (2012).
100. Id. at 643-45, 727 S.E.2d at 254-56.
101. Id. at 645, 727 S.E.2d at 256.
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in the hearing before the ALJ was whether the claimant's injuries could
be considered catastrophic, and this issue was distinct from whether the
injuries were compensable in the first place, and, therefore, it was error
for the ALJ to address the compensability of the back pain.0 2 The
case was remanded to the ALJ with instructions to make a ruling on the
catastrophic nature of the injury only.'0 3
In Ready Mix USA, Inc. v. Ross,1 4 the employer did not attend the
hearing and argued that the ALJ's award should be reversed because it
was not properly served with a hearing notice.'
Notwithstanding
information possibly relied on by the ALJ that was not tendered into
evidence at the hearing, the court of appeals held that the employer was
provided with adequate notice of the hearing.' ° The employer also
argued that the ALJ improperly admitted the claimant's medical
evidence because the claimant did not provide a copy of those records to
the employer at least ten days before the hearing, as required by Board
Rule 102(E)(3)(b). 1°7 However, the court determined that this Rule did
not mandate the exclusion of the medical records but rather gave the
AJ discretion to admit the records. 1" 8
At the commencement of the hearing before the AJ in Howard v.
Peachbelt Health & Rehabilitation Center,'0 9 where the claimant
sought benefits with respect to two accident dates, the parties entered
into a number of stipulations, including that the claimant had a work
accident on the second accident date and sustained injuries. The ALJ
considered evidence on whether the claimant injured herself on this
second date in addition to her injury from the first accident date. It
concluded that the second accident did not result in additional injury,
only a renewal of symptoms from the first accident date. On appeal, the
claimant argued that the ALJ failed to consider the stipulation, that she
had no notice that the AJ would not accept the stipulation, and that
she had no opportunity to introduce evidence showing injury from this
second accident."
The court of appeals agreed, ruling that the
stipulation was conclusive as to the employee suffering an independent
injury on the second accident date, and thus it was error for the AU to

102. Id. at 646-47, 727 S.E.2d at 256-57.
103. Id. at 647, 727 S.E.2d at 257.
104. 314 Ga. App. 775, 726 S.E.2d 90 (2012).

105. Id. at 777, 726 S.E.2d at 92.
106. Id. at 776-78, 726 S.E.2d at 92-93.
107. Id. at 778-79, 726 S.E.2d at 93; O.C.GA § 34 app. r. 102(EX3)(b) (2008 & Supp.
2012).
108. Ready Mix USA, 314 Ga. App. at 778-79, 726 S.E.2d at 93-94.
109. 314 Ga. App. 319, 723 S.E.2d 718 (2012).

110. Id. at 319-20, 723 S.E.2d at 719-20.
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consider evidence regarding the existence of a new injury and to make
a factual conclusion contrary to the stipulation."'
XI. FICTIONAL NEW ACCIDENT VS. CHANGE IN CONDITION
In Shaw Industries v. Scott,"2 the Georgia Court of Appeals explored
the typically murky distinction between fictional new accidents and a
change of condition."3 The claimant sustained a compensable injury
to her right foot in 1996, resulting in partial amputation for which she
received TTD benefits while out of work. She returned to work
approximately one year later in the employer's customer service
department. The partial amputation and resulting prosthesis altered
her gait, causing knee problems, and she underwent bilateral knee
surgery in May 1997. She continued to work for the employer over the
next twelve years, over which time her knee problems became progressively worse. She was diagnosed as having chondromalacia and
osteoarthritis caused by the amputation and altered gait. In March
2009, her physician recommended she cease working to alleviate the
knee pain, and in September 2009, she ceased working altogether on her
doctor's recommendation. The claimant then requested benefits, arguing
that her inability to work was the result of a fictional new injury in
March 2009 when her doctor first took her out of work. Following a
hearing, 4 the ALJ agreed. The board and the superior court af11
firmed.

On appeal, the court agreed with the employer that the claimant had
sustained a change in condition and not a fictional new injury, and thus
the claim for benefits was barred by the statute of limitations." 5 The
court determined that the facts of this case placed it in line with those
situations where the claimant was injured and awarded compensation,
returned to work performing her normal duties, and as a result of wear
and tear of ordinary life and performance of ordinary work tasks, her
condition gradually worsened to the point of being unable to perform her
ordinary work." 6 The court evidently placed little importance on the
fact that she returned to work in a presumably light-duty desk job,
stating that "the progressive aggravation of [her] injuries, which was
caused by the performance of her work duties and which ultimately

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 321, 723 S.E.2d at 720.
310 Ga. App. 750, 713 S.E.2d 917 (2011).
Id. at 750, 713 S.E.2d at 917-18.
Id. at 751-52, 713 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 753, 713 S.E.2d at 919.
Id. at 752-53, 713 S.E.2d at 919.
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resulted in her inability to work, can only be characterized as a change
in condition."" 7
XII.

FICTIONAL NEW ACCIDENT VS. CHANGE IN CONDITION/
DILIGENT JOB SEARCH
Donnelley v. Ogletree,"8 the Georgia Court of Appeals

In R.R.
reached a different result from that in Scott, and the court also held that
the board may not impose further requirements on the claimant's
Maloney burden."9 The claimant in Ogletree sought reinstatement of
TTD benefits from his former employer, claiming he sustained a fictional
new injury and was unable to obtain suitable employment. The claimant
had originally injured his neck and upper extremities in October 2002,
underwent carpal tunnel surgery and received benefits, and then
returned to light-duty work in June 2003. He worked in a variety of
light-duty jobs that exceeded his work restrictions, and his pain
increased and condition worsened. The claimant was laid off in April
2008 due to the employer's reduced workload, and he began searching
for work within his restrictions. He submitted a list of twenty-four jobs
for which he submitted applications, although he did not meet with any
of these potential employers."
In October 2008, he underwent a lumbar fusion and filed a claim
requesting TTD beginning April 2008, based upon a fictional new
accident as of the date of his layoff. The ALJ found that the claimant
had sustained a fictional new accident and met his Maloney burden of
a diligent but unsuccessful job search. The board affirmed the findings
as to the fictional new accident, but it reversed the finding that the
claimant had performed a diligent job search. The superior court
reversed this second portion of the board's finding and reinstated the
ALJ's award. 2 '

The court of appeals first rejected the employer's argument that the
claimant sustained a change of condition as opposed to a fictional new
accident. 122 The claimant did not return to normal or ordinary work,

but instead he had new circumstances imposed upon him in the form of
light-duty work that exceeded his limitations."
Some evidence

117. Id. at 753, 713 S.E.2d at 919.
118. 312 Ga. App. 475, 718 S.E.2d 825 (2011).
119. Id. at 481, 718 S.E.2d at 831; see also Maloney v. Gordon Cnty. Farms, 265 Ga.
825, 828, 462 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1995).
120. Ogletree, 312 Ga. App. at 475-77, 718 S.E.2d at 827-28.
121. Id. at 477, 718 S.E.2d at 828.
122. Id. at 479, 718 S.E.2d at 829.
123. Id. at 479, 718 S.E.2d at 830.
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existed for the board to find that the date the24disability manifested itself
was the date the claimant ceased working.'
The court then turned to whether the claimant conducted a diligent
The employer contended that the claimant did not
job search.'
satisfy his Maloney burden because he failed to show a diligent search,
as concluded by the board.12 The court held that the board relied
upon an erroneous legal theory in making its findings, as it imposed the
additional burden of securing interviews and in-person site visits with
would-be employers.' 27 On such grounds, the court held that the
board's decision was properly reversed. 2 Finally, the court disposed
of the employer's argument that the claimant did not provide notice of
WC-14,
a lower back injury, based on the claimant's 1broadly-worded
9
hearing testimony, and the post-hearing briefs.
XIII. DILIGENT JOB SEARCH
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Brown Mechanical Contractors,Inc.
v. Maughon'30 reached the opposite result regarding the claimant's job
search, concluding that contacting more than one hundred employers did
not necessarily constitute a diligent search. 3 ' The claimant sustained
a shoulder injury and continued working within his restrictions as a
track hoe operator until he was laid off for reasons unrelated to his
disability. The claimant then contacted in excess of one hundred wouldbe employers over the six-month period leading up to his hearing date.
and
The ALJ found that the claimant conducted a diligent job search
32
awarded TTD benefits; however, the board vacated and denied.
The board, in finding that the claimant's job search was not diligent,
relied upon factors including the following- 110 searches over 144 "work
days" is not sufficient; searching an average of less than once per day is
not diligent; the claimant failed to follow up with twenty-two employers;
he went periods of twenty-seven and eighteen consecutive days without
searching; he lost two offered positions because of a purported need for
surgery which had not been scheduled; and despite employment history
in managerial or sales positions, the claimant sought physical labor jobs

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 480, 718 S.E.2d at 830.
Id.
Id.; see also Maloney, 265 Ga. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 608-09.
Ogletree, 312 Ga. App. at 481, 718 S.E.2d at 831.
Id.
Id. at 481-82, 718 S.E.2d at 831-32.
317 Ga. App. 106, 728 S.E.2d 757 (2012).
Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 758-59.
Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 758.
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and avoided retail jobs. 3 The superior court reversed and reinstated
the ALJ's decision."M
The court of appeals summarized the standard of review for a diligent
job search as calling for the claimant to prove diligent but unsuccessful
efforts to obtain suitable employment, and leaving to the factfinder's
discretion whether the claimant's disability is the proximate cause of the
unemployment. 3 5 The court held that evidence existed to support the
board's conclusion that the claimant's search was not diligent, namely
the factors relied on by the board.'36 The court then distinguished
R.R. Donnelley v. Ogletree,137 where the board applied an erroneous
legal theory in relying on factors outside the claimant's control such as
sitting for interviews."3 8
XIV. CONTROVERTING CLAIMS
In Crossmark v. Strickland,'39 the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited
a claim previously before the court in 2009, at which time it held that
the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear what was in effect an
interlocutory appeal from a board decision remanding for additional
proceedings on the validity of a notice to controvert. 40 The employer
had voluntarily begun paying the claimant TTD benefits following an
accident, but later controverted the claim and terminated the benefits.
The ALJ denied the claim, finding that the claimant failed to show she
had sustained a compensable injury. The employee appealed to the
board, contending for the first time that the employer's notice to
controvert was invalid because it failed to pay her all compensation due
at the time of its notice to controvert in violation of O.C.G.A. § 34-9221(h) and Board Rule 221.141 The board vacated and remanded for
additional proceedings as to the validity of the notice to controvert. 42
Following a second hearing, the ALJ found that the employer's notice
to controvert was invalid, awarding benefits and attorney fees. The
board and the superior court affirmed.' 43 The court rejected the
argument that the board was not authorized to consider an argument by

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 758-59.
Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 759.
Id. at 108-09, 728 S.E.2d at 759.
Id. at 110, 728 S.E.2d at 760.
312 Ga. App. 475, 718 S.E.2d 825 (2011).
Id. at 481, 718 S.E.2d at 831; Maughon, 317 Ga. App. at 110, 728 S.E.2d at 760.

139. 310 Ga. App. 303, 713 S.E.2d 430 (2011).

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 303-04, 713 S.E.2d at 432.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A-. § 34-9-221(h).
Crossmark, Inc., 310 Ga. App. at 304, 713 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 304-05, 713 S.E.2d at 432-33.
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the claimant that was raised for the first time on appeal, and found
support in the board's jurisdiction and authority to remand for additional proceedings.'"
Turning to the substantive argument regarding the controvert, the
court held that the controvert was invalid because the employer had
underpaid TTD benefits by roughly $100/week and did not pay for the
first seven days of benefits once the claimant remained out of work for
twenty-one consecutive days.'45 Therefore, it could not contest the
initial compensability of the claim without newly-discovered evidence or
a change in condition. 4 ' Upon learning of a claim, an employer may
either controvert a claim within twenty-one days (not paying benefits),
or if it begins paying benefits, may controvert within sixty days of the
date on which the first payment of benefits was due. However, if it
takes this second approach, it must pay all compensation due to the
claimant as of the filing of the controvert.14 7 Finally, the court held
that while the superior court employed the wrong standard
of review,
14
the decision was affirmed as being right for any reason.

144. Id. at 305-06, 713 S.E.2d at 433-34.
145. Id. at 308-09, 713 S.E.2d at 435-36.
146. Id. at 308, 713 S.E.2d at 435.
147. Id. at 307-09, 713 S.E.2d at 435.
148. Id. at 309, 713 S.E.2d at 436.

